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By Joren S. Bass'
I. Introduction
General liability insurance serves as one of the
most important means of paying for the clean-up of
contaminated soil and groundwater,' Insurance cover-
age disputes, however, consume huge amounts of time
and money.2 While the California Supreme Court has
resolved many other aspects of the insurance coverage
debate, for example,deciding when liability for long-
tail pollution claims will trigger coverage problems
3
and defining key policy terms like "expected- or
s BA History, 1992, Yale University I D, 1998, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law The author is currently
serving as law clerk to the Honorable James K Singleton, Chief
judge, United States District Court, District of Alaska The author
would like to thank Dean Leo Martinez for his assistance in select-
ed this Note's topic, and the attorney practice group at Perkins Coie
in Seattle. Washington, for an introduction to the substance of
insurance law
1. Liability for environmental pollution comes in many
forms Se JOEL S Mcs cirz, EN;ivR ETAL LrASLmi AND RE..
PROPERTY TRANA ccNs § 4 2 to 4 15 11989) Federal environmental
statutes such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, Recovery and Liability Act 42 U S C §§ 9601-9675
(1994). the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U SC §.
6901-6991(1 (1994). the Federal Clean Water Act, 33 U S C §§ 1251-
1387 (1994); and state statutes such as the Carpenter-Presley-
Tanner Hazardous Substances Account Act Cal Health & Safety
Code §§ 25300-25395 IDeering 1997J, can impose legal duties on
property owners of the sort that allow indemnification by insurance
policies Common law tort doctrines like nuisance and trespass
also implicate third party Comprehensive General Liability ICGLI
claims, See, eg. Cal Civ Code § 3479 (defining nuisance as
"lalnything which is inlunous to health, or is indecent or offensive
to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enioyment of life and property .;
Buchanan v Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist, 56 Cal App
3d 757. 768 (1976) (holding "future interference with the enjoyment
of land is a nuisance as is a condition which is a danger to the
neighborhood'. Restatement (Secondl of Torts §§ 838, 839 11965j
(defining common law nuisance and trespassj
2. Insurance companies and industrial property owners
spend an estimated $500 million annually to litfgate insurance
coverage disputes See Douglas L Hallett & Law'rence C Bemey,
Trigger of Coverage: A Posnenan Analysis, in l0ra,* 1AsL A .
ExcEss. AND REiNsumcE CVEVA E D4PUr-S 39 IPLI Litig & Admin
Practice Coursebook Series No 454, 1993) available in WESTLAW
PLI-LIT Database Moreover, legal costs may run as high as seven-
ty percent of total cleanup costs See Eugene R Anderson &
Giovanni Rodriguez, Settling Environmental Coverage Disputes What You
Know About Your Enemy Cannot Hurt You in Toxic Tort Claims Insurance
Coverage in 1991 and Beyond 383 (PLI Comm L & Practice Course
Handbook Series No 579. 19911 available in WESTLAW, PLI-LIT
Database.
3, See generally Montrose Chem Corp v, Admiral Ins- Co., 913
P.2d 878 (Cal 1995)
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"intended,"4 it has not yet conclusively
resolved how to allocate costs when an
insured's liability for soil or groundwater pollu-
tion triggers multiple insurance policies.5 This
Note, by analyzing allocation schemes adopted
by various other courts and the legal and pub-
lic policy considerations recognized by the
California Supreme Court in recent insurance
coverage cases, suggests a comprehensive rule
for allocating insurance coverage in California.
In doing so, the author hopes to suggest an
efficient, predictable way to resolve an impedi-
ment to the clean-up of contaminated soil and
groundwater in California and elsewhere.
6
The terms and language related to the
arcane world of insurance coverage cases are
not necessarily self-explanatory. Part 11 of this
Note discusses the general history and frame-
work of Comprehensive General Liability (CGL)
insurance policies and sets forth the basic lan-
guage needed to understand the allocation
issue. It explains the evolution of the standard
form CGL insurance policies and demonstrates
why language from different insurance cases
applies regardless of which insurance company
wrote the policy.
Part III of this Note discusses the different
allocation schemes adopted by other state and
federal courts. By looking to the leading allo-
4. See Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1, 72-73 (1996) (adopting the -sub-
jective" standard, which requires the insurer to cover loss-
es unless it proves that the insured actually expected its
activities to cause injuries for which the insured seeks
coverage).
5. This Note applies with equal force to disputes
about insurance coverage in mass tort situations, such as
asbestos and products liability litigation, so long as the
bodily injury or property damage is continuous or pro-
gressively deteriorating through multiple insurance poli-
cies' periods. This issue exists in California only because
the California Supreme Court adopted a "continuous trig-
ger" in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 913
P.2d at 878. In jurisdictions employing manifestation or
injury-in-fact triggers, "other insurance" clauses that are
standard parts of the CGL policies will resolve how liabil-
ity is allocated. See Ronald R. Robinson, Coverage Allocation
Law: A Primer on the History, Evolution and State of Court
Mandated Shared Indemnity and Defense Obligations, at 510-11
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
Feb-Mar. 1995) available in WESTLAW PLI-LIT Database.
Only those jurisdictions that employ theories based on
continuous trigger, exposure triggers, multiple policy trig-
cation cases,7 the author will analyze both the
strengths and weaknesses of other courts'
methods of apportioning liability. Based on
these models, this Note will set forth a new
allocation scheme appropriate for California in
Part V.
Part IV explains the basic principles of con-
tract and insurance law relied on by California
courts. It analyzes the California Supreme
Court's decision in Montrose Chemical Corp. v.
Admiral Insurance Co.8 and addresses the legal
and policy considerations implicated by that
and other California insurance decisions.
Because both law and public policy will play a
central role in determining the manner in
which the California Supreme Court chooses to
resolve the allocation issue, Part IV will also
look closely at broad issues of Cal fornia pub-
lic policy as applied to insurance coverage dis-
putes. The author will explain why no method
so far employed fully satisfies the legal and
public policy requirements set forth by the
California Supreme Court.
In Part V, the author will suggest a method
for allocating liability in California insurance
disputes where CGL policies have been impli-
cated by progressive or continuously deterio-
rating personal injury or property damage. The
solution relies on the Montrose decision and
gers, or where more than an injury-in-fact has occurred
will courts need to determine how to allocate liability.
6. Litigation costs may account for up to 70% of all
money spent on Superfund sites. See Bouska, U S. Insurers'
Potential Liability for Inactive Hazardous Waste Sites. Scenarios
and Discussion, presented at Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Policy Research and Insur. (Sept. 27, 1990), quoted in
Douglas L. Hallett & Lawrence C Berney, Trigger of
Coverage: A Posnerian Analysis, in IOTH ANNUAL INSURANCE,
ExcEss, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 39 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Coursebook Series No. 454, 1993) available
in WESTLAW PLI-LIT Database. Adopting a single, clear
rule for apportioning liability will remove one Impedi-
ment to the efficient resolution of insurance coverage dis-
putes.
7. See, e.g.. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
667 F.2d 1034, 1048 (D.C, Cir. 1981) (discus.;ing Joint and
several allocation); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co,,
650 A.2d 974, 987-88 (N.J. 1994) (discussing pro rata allo-
cation based on schedule or years of coverage multiplied
by coverage limits); J.H. France Co. v. Allstate Ins, Co., 626
A.2d 502, 507-09 (Pa. 1993) (discussing joint and several
allocation).
8. 913 P.2d at 878.
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calls upon aspects of allocation schemes
employed by other courts. Based on principles
of insurance law and public policy, the sug-
gested solution seeks to provide an efficient,
predictable model that California and other
courts can rely on when determining who pays
for the cleanup of environmental pollution.
II. Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance Policies
A. Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance
California courts look first to the terms of
insurance policies to resolve disputes.9 The
courts' goal is to give effect to the mutual
intentions of the parties.'0 Where the policy
language is clear and explicit, such language
governs." Terms in an insurance policy should
be interpreted in their ordinary and popular
sense, even if the policyholder is sophisticat-
ed.' 2 If policy language is ambiguous, it should
be resolved by interpreting the ambiguous pro-
visions in accordance with the insured's objec-
tively reasonable expectations. 3 Only where
the insured's objectively reasonable expecta-
tion does not resolve the ambiguity of the pol-
icy will the provision be construed in favor of
the insured.' 4 California courts also look to
public policy to resolve insurance conflicts
when policy language does not control the
issue.
5
The typical claim in which allocation issues
are raised is one in which the harm occurs over
a long period of time.' 6 Whether the harm is
damage to soil or groundwater from seeping
contaminants, progressive deterioration of
9. See, e.g.. AUI Ins. Co. v. Superior Court. 799 R2d
1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990).
10. See Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1, 36 (1996).
11. See Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P2d
545, 552 (Cal. 1992).
12. See Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta. 640 P2d 764.
767 (Cal. 1982).
13. See Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 555.
14. See id. at 555-56.
15. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
913 P.2d 878, 901-04 (Cal. 1995).
lung tissue as a result of asbestos exposure, or
the solidification of an implantee's breasts or
the alleged development of immune systems
disorders as a result of silicone leakage, the
extended number of years over which the harm
develops likely implicates more than one
insurance policy owned by the responsible
company, Because California has adopted a
"continuous injury" trigger, every insurance
policy owned by the insured company-from
the time the person or property was initially
exposed, to the time when the injury or dam-
age manifests itself-is triggered and must
therefore provide coverage.17 At issue in the
allocation debate is which insurance compa-
nies must pay and for what percentage of costs
or damages are they responsible,
B. The History of the Standard Form
Comprehensive General Liability Policy
American industry has relied on standard
form general liability insurance policies to
indemnify their business risks since the intro-
duction of standard form policies in 1940.18
Prior to the development of the standard form
contract, industry and its insurers negotiated
individual policies,'9 The lack of standardiza-
tion that resulted from individualized policy
drafting confused the parties, as well as the
courts called upon to interpret the disputes.20
Standardization of policy language resolved
some of the disputes; nonetheless, the litiga-
tion spawned by the evolving language of stan-
dard form CGL policies demonstrates that
standardization still failed to solve all dis-
putes.2'
CGL policies written prior to 1966 general-
16 See BA'w R OsrAGER & TR:mss R Ne ,
HANDBOOK GN INSURANCE COVERACE DSPUTEs § 9 01 (7th ed.
1994)
17 See id Liability policies are triggered,' meaning
that they provide coverage, when lnjury or damage takes
place during the policy period See id
18 See IACK P GIQsoN & MAURIEEN C McLENooN,
INTERNAioNAL RisK MANAzKEEsT INs5sTttu INC . COMMERCIA.
L'IIeiY INSUMZNE IVC I (2nd reprint 1990).
19 Seeid
20 See d
21 See Tung Yin, Comment, Nailing Ilo to a Wall A
Uniforn Approach for Adjudicating Insurance Coverage Disputes in
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ly covered liability "caused by accident."22 The
original standard form, which was revised in
1943 and 1955, agreed to
pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death at any time resulting
therefrom, sustained by any person
and caused by accident land I to pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally oblig-
ated to pay as damages because of
injury to or destruction of property,
including the loss of use thereof,
caused by accident.
23
Prior to 1966, standard form-CGL policies pro-
vided no definition of "accident."
24
After 1966, the insurance industry substi-
tuted the term "occurrence" for "accident."25 In
response to potential coverage issues involv-
ing continuous or progressively deteriorating
bodily injury or property damage, Richard
Elliott, then-Secretary of the National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters, noted that the
change from "accident" to "occurrence" was
made "in order to clarify the intent with respect
to time of coverage and application of policy
limits, particularly in situations involving a
related series of events attributed to the same
factor."26 Policies issued after the 1966 revision,
Product Liability Cases with Delayed Manifestation Injuries and
Damages, 83 CAL. LAw REV. 1243 (1995).
22. See John J. O'Leary, Jr., Current Trends In CGL
Insurance Coverage for Environmental Claims: An Introduction to
Some Key Coverage Issues, reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL
COVERAGE: FROM INTERPRETATION TO LITIGATION 104 (Tort and
Ins. Practice Sec., ABA 1991).
23. 1966 Policy Jacket Specimen, reprinted in GIBSON
& McLENDON, supra note 18, at IV.T.7 (reprinting sample
CGL policy).
24. See O'Leary, supra note 22, at 104. Under
California law, a plain usage definition of "accident"
would determine whether or not a policy was triggered.
See Reserve Ins. Co. v. Piscotta. 640 P.2d 764, 770 (Cal.
1982).
25. See O'Leary, supra note 22, at 104.
26. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913
P.2d 878, 892 (Cal. 1995).
generally referred to as "occurrence policies,"
therefore provided that
Itlhe company will pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of bodily injury or
property damage to damage to which
the insurance applies, caused by an
occurrence.
27
The policies typically defined "occurrence" as
an accident, including injurious expo-
sure to conditions, which results, dur-
ing the policy period, in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the
insured.28
In 1973, the insurance industry redefined the
term "occurrence" by adding the phrase "con-
tinuous or repeated" before the term "expo-
sure."29 As will be explained in Part I11, the
courts' interpretations of what constitutes an
injury sufficient to trigger coverage play a cen-
tral role in the allocation debate.
As early as the 1950s, insurers introduced
owned property exclusions and other endorse-
ments that could limit the amount of coverage
provided by CGL policies for the clean-up of
environmental contamination.3 0 In 1973, the
standard form CGL policy adopted the pollu-
27. O'Leary, supra note 22, at 104.
28. Id.
29. See O'Leary, supra note 22, at 104. Insureds
argue that the phrase "expected or intended" applies not
to the discharge that caused the property damage but
rather to the injury or property damage. See, e.g., Shell Oil
Co. v. Accident & Cas. Co. of Winterthur, No. 278953 (Cal,
Super. Ct. Oct. 6. 1988). California courts have adopted
the insured's interpretation of this debate, ruling that
"expected and intended" should be Interpreted as sepa-
rate terms that give rise to liability In all cases except
where the insurer can demonstrate that the Insured sub-
jectively expected injuries "caused by an oc:urrence." See
Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas, & Sur, Co,, 45 Cal,
App. 4th 1, 74-75 (1996).
30. See Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12
Cal. App. 4th 715, 759 (1993) (reprinting Travelers'
Insurance Co. policy which, between 1951 a id 1966, pro-
vided that "itlhese exclusions shall not apply to real prop-
Joren S. Bas
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tion exclusion. 31 This type of exclusion may or
may not affect the manner in which liability is
allocated, depending on the allocation scheme
adopted.
3 2
C. Terms And Definitions Of CGL Policies
Where an insured's loss is covered by more
than one primary insurance policy, courts ini-
tially must choose between allocating liability
based on a joint and several scheme or allo-
cating under a pro rata scheme. 33 Joint and sev-
eral liability, which is grounded in the "all
sums" language of the standard form CGL poli-
cies,34 requires all insurers whose policies are
triggered by a loss to cover jointly the entire
loss. 35 Pro rata schemes are grounded in an
interpretation of the insurance contract that
erty. other than property owned by the insured, provided
such property is not at the time of the accident In the
care. custody or control of the named insured"); Titan
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 22 Cal. App. 4th 457, 471
(1994) (reprinting Aetna policy language which provided
that'itlhis insurance does not apply.., to property dam-
age to (1) property owned or occupied by or rented to the
insured; (2) property used by the insured").
31. See 1966 Policy Jacket Specimen, supra note 23.
Two pollution exclusions are a common part of CGL poli-
cies. An example of the standard pollution exclusion from
a Northbrook Property and Casualty Insurance Co. policy
precluded coverage for "bodily injury arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors.
soot, fumes, acids, contaminants or pollutants Into or
upon the land, the atmosphere or any water course or
body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such
discharge, dispersal, release or escape Is sudden and
accidental." ACL Techs., Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Cas.
Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1773. 1778 (1993); see also Haskel.
Inc. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 4th 963. 970 (1995)
(reprinting a Hartford Accident and Indemnity Corp. stan-
dard pollution exclusion that is substantively equivalent
but grammatically different). Other insurers incorporated
the absolute pollution exclusion.' which typically provid-
ed that insurance would not apply "to bodily injury or
property damage arising out of the actual or threatened
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants: (a)
at or from premises owned, rented or occupied by the
named insured; lorl. .. (c) which are at any time trans-
ported, handled, stored, treated, disposed of. or
processed as waste by or for the named Insured." Titan
Corp.. 22 Cal. App. 4th at 465 (quoting Aetna's absolute
pollution exclusion). California courts' interpretations of
the pollution exclusion vary greatly. See Margot A.
Metzner. Insurance Coverage for Environmental Claims, in 12TH
ANNUAL INSURANCE, ExcEss. AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE
DisPUTEs 27- 29 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Coursebook
assigns liability individually under each policy
and therefore allocates liability based on a for-
mula derived from policy limits or periods of
insurance. 6 Courts have adopted various per-
mutations-none entirely satisfying the deci-
sion by the California Supreme Court in
Montrose-of both joint and several and pro
rata allocation schemes.
The issues of "stacking' policy limits and
the order of "exhaustion" are also important to
resolving which insurance companies are
liable and when they will be asked to pay for
coverage. 37 'Stacking' occurs when an insured
is able to recover up to the limit of more than
one policy at the same level of coverage.38 In
the context of pollution clean-up and asbestos
claims, stacking policy limits generally mean
Series No H4-522. 1995) available in WESTLAW PLI-LIT
Database
32, See Owned Property Clause Inapplicable in New Jersey
Actions. in Mealeys Litigation Reports Insurance, Aug. 1.
1996. available in WESTLAW. MLRINS Database Ireporting
that in Reliance Insurance Co v Armstrong World
Industries. Inc. No A-703-93Ts IN I. Super. July 22, 1996),
a New Jersey court ruled that where groundwater was con-
taminated the "owned property exclusion- did not pre-
dude insurance coverage). see also Al11 Ins- Co, v Superior
Court. 799 P2d 1253, 1264 n-7 (Cal, 1990) (holding that
because the state and federal government own the
groundwater, so long as the groundwater has been conta-
minated, the owned property exclusion does not apply)
33 See Garret G Gillespie. Note, The Alloation of
Coverage Responsibility Among Multiple Tggered Commercial
General Liability Policies in Environmental Cases LifeAfterOwens-
Illinois. 15 VA ENn.. L I 525. 528 (1996)
34, See discussion supra Part IlB_
35. See Robinson. supra note 5, at 511
36 See id at 518-21,
37 See KENNETH S AuRAm, EmiRoNMENTAL LLALrm
INSURANCE LAw 14 (1991)
38. Companies often purchase insurance in layers.
In the same policy period a company might have a "pri-
mary" policy which responds first to any claim and which
provides coverage up to a certain limit- Excess policies
then supply coverage for the same time period above the
primary level A court that allows stacking would allow the
policyholder to gain coverage for more than one policy at
the same penod See OsTAi & NEwmAN, supra note 16, at
§ 13 10 For example, if a company purchased primary
insurance policies for SI million for each of five years, an
allocation scheme that allows that company to recover
three million dollars of coverage from those policies
allows it to "stack" its primary coverage. See id,
"M 0111 bvkil 6wiloffakil u(NityWinl " 1999
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that "when multiple consecutive policies are
triggered by an occurrence, each policy can be
required to respond to the claim to the full
limit of the policy."39
Exhaustion similarly has great importance
on the allocation of costs. Exhaustion can
either be horizontal or vertical. 40 A court allow-
ing horizontal exhaustion allows recovery from
more than one primary policy and is the func-
tional equivalent of stacking.4' Vertical exhaus-
tion allows an insured to recover from a prima-
ry insurer and, after exhausting that coverage,
to recover from excess policies above the pri-
mary policy for the same time period.42
III. Allocation Methods Adopted By Other
Courts
A. Joint and Several Allocation
Under joint and several liability, all insur-
ers that wrote triggered policies are held joint-
ly liable for the full limit of each triggered pol-
icy.43 Those courts that have adopted joint and
several allocation rely on the language from
standard form CGL policies, which typically
require insurers to pay "all sums which the
insured becomes legally obligated to pay."44
Courts have adopted two permutations of joint
and several allocation: joint and several alloca-
tion with horizontal exhaustion and without
stacking, and joint and several allocation with
stacking and vertical exhaustion. 45
One commentator has suggested that
39. Lawrence A. Silverman & Phillip C. Essig,
Stacking of Policy Limits and joint and Several Liability of Insurers
in Cases Involving Long-Term, Cumulative Injury or Damage, in
INSURANCE, EXCESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES
1989, at 45, 51-52 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 369, 1989), available in WESTLAW,
PLI-LIT Database.
40. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 526-32.
41. Seeid. at 526.
42. See id. at 526-27.
43. See id. at 511.
44. E.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667
F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981); AC & S Inc. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 974 (3rd Cir. 1985); Hatco Corp. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1334, 1344 (D.N.l. 1992);
Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 45 Cal.
App. 4th 1. 48-49 (1996); J.H. France Refractories Co. v.
three general results are produced under any
variation of joint and several allocation. 4
6
"First, one carrier is held responsible for prop-
erty damage [that] did not occur during the
chosen policy period."47 Second, the chosen
carrier becomes responsible for thousands of
claims and must bear the risk of other carriers'
potential insolvency, all years when the
insured carried no insurance or was self-
insured, and all periods where policies have
been lost and coverage cannot be deter-
mined.48 Third, the commentator argues, the
concept of policy limits may become "a fic-
tion," because where policies are allowed to be
stacked and exhausted liability does not end
until all liability has been covered 49 Each of
these concerns will be addressed below.50
1. Joint and Several Allocation Without
Stacking
The leading case for joint and several allo-
cation is Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North
America.5 There, the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia adopted a
continuous trigger for injuries related to expo-
sure to asbestos products manufactured by
Keene and its corporate predecessors. 52 The
court then ruled that once liabilily was trig-
gered, every insurer is liable in full for Keene's
losses.53 While the court ruled that the insurer
could invoke the policies' other insurance
clauses thereby forcing the insurers to wage a
second round of litigation to allocate liability,
Allstate Ins. Co.. 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993).
45. See Gillespie, supra note 33, at 535. Gillespie
notes that other permutations are possibie. Id, However,
they have not been widely adopted, or ever considered, by
other courts. See id.
46. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 515-16
47. Id. at 515.
48. See id. Note that this argument Ignores the doc-
trine of contribution on which the Keene court relied, See
infra notes 72-73.
49. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 515.16,
50. See discussion infra Part V.
51. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. ,denied 455 U.S.
1007 (1982).
52. See id. at 1047.
53. See id.
Joren S. Bass \'olano 5. Numlx 2
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it rejected the argument that Keene should be
held liable for periods of self insurance. Basing
its decision on the "all sums" language of the
CGL policies issued to Keene, the court reject-
ed the insurers' argument that apportionment
should be based on a pro rata allocation bal-
ancing time and risk.54 Rather, the Keene court
reasoned that "[olnce triggered, each policy
covers Keene's liability. There is nothing in the
policies that provides for a reduction of the
insurer's liability if an injury occurs only in part
during a policy period."55
Underlying the Keene court's allocation was
its definition of the injury at issue. The court
ruled that "inhalation exposure, exposure in
residence, and manifestation all trigger cover-
age under the policies. We interpret 'bodily
injury' to mean any part of the single injurious
process that asbestos-related diseases
entail."56 Therefore, according to the Keene
court, the entire "bodily injury" that triggered
the insurers' liability occurred when someone
inhaled the asbestos, or during the period of
time when the disease developed, or when
symptoms of a disease were first discovered.'
7
If Keene owned insurance during any such peri-
od, the court reasoned, its insurers were oblig-
ated to indemnify "'all sums' lwhichl Keene
becomes legally obligated to pay."' 8 Based on
the policies explicit language, liability was
therefore joint and several.
Under the court's formula, each triggered
policy covered Keene's entire liability.' 9 The
court rejected the insurers' argument that
Keene would inappropriately benefit from peri-
ods when it did not purchase insurance, ruling
instead that an insured would reasonably
expect complete security from each policy it
54. See id. at 1047 n.26.
55. Id. at 1048.
56. Id. at 1047.
57. See id.
58. id. at 1047.
59. See id. at 1048.
60. See id. at 1047-48.
61. See id. at 1049.
62. Id. at 1049 (footnote omitted).
purchased.60 Rather than allowing Keene "to
enjoy the benefits of insurance coverage which
it has never paid for," as one insurer argued,
the court reasoned that Keene had paid for
insurance against all liability for bodily injury.
61
According to the court, "Itihe policies do not
distinguish between an injury that is caused by
occurrences that continue to transpire over a
long period of time and more common types of
injury. Nor do the policies provide that 'injury'
must occur entirely during the policy period for
full indemnity to be provided."6 2 Therefore,
even though Keene did not own insurance dur-
ing some periods when the triggering events
occurred, the court ruled that its reasonable
expectation that its insurance indemnified it
for "all sums which [Keenel becomes legally
obligated to pay" meant that its insurers were
nonetheless responsible 63
The court, however, rejected Keene's argu-
ment that insureds should be allowed to stack
policies.64 Noting that its decision was an
attempt to conform asbestos claims to obliga-
tions for other injuries, the court ruled that
only one policy's limit can apply to each
injury.65 The court therefore allowed Keene to
select the single policy under which it was to
be indemnified and exhaust it.66
The practical effect of the Keene court's
decision is that an insured may select a differ-
ent policy to respond to each injury In the
asbestos or medical implant products liability
context, for example, coverage should not suf-
fer. Coverage for single large claims, however,
like those in the context of environmental pol-
lution, might leave the insured with very little
insurance coverage for a very large liability.67
While the Keene decision does not allow stack-
63, Seid
64 Seid at 1049-50,
65 Seeid at 1049
66 See id at 1049-50.
67 For example, if a company incurred asbestos-
related claims, over a 25 year penod and had $1 million in
insurance coverage for each of those years, under Keene
the company could assign different awards to different
years to maximize coverage However, if a company with
the same coverage incurred $25 million in progressive
environmental hability, it would be forced to select one
hlafts qM bqkil Wammkil bobkVnte 1999
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ing, it may allow vertical exhaustion. Although
the court did not explicitly address the issue of
vertical exhaustion, an interpretation allowing
an insured to call on both primary and excess
insurers to cover all loses for a single year
would comport with the court's reasoning.68
Therefore, while an insured may call on only
one primary policy to cover each loss, it may
arguably rely on all policies above that primary
policy as well.
The Keene decision, however, does not pre-
clude the possibility of stacking. One commen-
tator noted that where liability results from
more immediate harm, like that resulting from
an automobile accident, excess coverage
would cover the remainder of a tort claim that
had exhausted the primary insurance policy.69
"To remain logically consistent, the Keene court
... would likely have responded that.., once
an insured had exhausted the one policy it
selected, it would then be allowed to call on
any excess coverage over that policy."70 Others
argue that joint and several allocation, even
without explicit language allowing policyhold-
ers to stack their coverage, nonetheless allows
them to "de facto stack."7' If an insured was
held liable for multiple claims, it could assign
year-$ million of coverage-and would receive no cover-
age for the rest of its liability. See generally Part II B.
68. See Gillespie, supra note 33, at 545.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 530.
72. See id.
73. Some experts argue that de facto stacking is
unlikely in the environmental context, where injuries can
result in single massive claims. See Gillespie, supra note
33, at 536 n.57 (citing Thomas Baker & Eva Orlebeke, The
Application of Per-Occurrence Limits From Successive Policies, 3
ENVTL. CLAIMs J. 411, 411 (1991)). Gillespie argues that
because Keene was an asbestos claim and not a property
damage case, its language should not be considered
binding for environmental pollution cases, even in the
Keene jurisdiction. See Gillespie, supra note 33, at 536 n.57
(citing Baker & Orlebeke, supra at 425). However, in the
asbestos context, a corporation could -de facto stack"-
the policyholder maximizes its coverage without paying
additional costs by assigning injuries to separate policy
periods. See Gillespie, supra note 33, at 536-37; see also dis-
cussion infra Part lll.C.
each claim to a different year's insurance cov-
erage, thereby obtaining "an exhaustion of lim-
its in every single coverage period."72 For exam-
ple, if a corporation that purchased liability
insurance for every year between 1960 and
1980 was held liable for third party property
damage at twenty separate manufacturing
sites, it could assign each site's injury to a sep-
arate year, thereby escaping the anti-stacking
language contained in Keene. 73 The ability to de
facto stack is even more pronounced in
asbestos and products liability cases, where a
company's product causes numerous injuries.
The Keene court also noted that the "other
insurance" clauses found in most standard
form CGL policies7 4 will not expose one insur-
er to total liability for any one injury.7" Rather,
the court found that the common law doctrine
of contribution allows liable insurers to collect
from one another.76
2. Joint and Several Allocation with
Stacking and Vertical Exhaustion
Some courts have adopted a joint and sev-
eral scheme that allows insureds to stack their
coverage.7 7 Under such schemes, an insured
must still select the policy that will cover each
74. The other insurance clause found in one of the
INA policies at issue in Keene provided that "lwlhen both
this insurance and other insurance apply to the loss on
the same basis, whether primary, excessive or contingent,
INA shall be liable under this policy for a greater propor-
tion of the loss than stated in the applicable contribution
provision below." Keene, 667 F2d at 1050, The contribution
formulae provide for contribution by limits and contribu-
tion by equal shares. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at n.50. Forcing insurers to wage a sec-
ondary battle among themselves for contribution raises
the transactional costs of litigating, or even settling, envi-
ronmental claims. By decreasing incentives to settle or
otherwise resolve insurance claims, an allo:ation scheme
that requires the contribution model envisioned by the
Keene court makes such a scheme pocrly-suited for
California. Rather, an appropriate scheme will focus on
quick resolution of liability, and emphasize settlement
rather than costly, contentious, and expensive litigation,
As discussed below, a pure Keene formula would serve
California poorly.
77. See. eg., J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate
Ins. Co.. 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993)
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occurrence. 78 Unlike the Keene formulation,
however, if liability exhausts that policy's limit,
the insured may select another primary policy
to cover the rest of the liability.79 Indeed, as
one commentator notes, where an insured
exhausts the limit of all primary policies, it
may then begin selecting policies in its first
layer of excess coverage, continuing until the
insured receives full indemnification or all
excess policies have been exhausted as well.8°
In J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 8 1 an asbestos and silicosis action,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a
joint and several allocation scheme that
allowed insureds to stack coverage. 82 The court
based its decision on four factors. First, the
court adopted the "all sums" interpretation of
the insurance policies at issue.8 3 Under the
court's definition of injury, where the court
held that "all stages of the disease process
[constitutel bodily injury sufficient to trigger
the insurers' obligation to indemnify,"84 the
court explicitly adopted the Keene court's ruling
that "lolnce triggered, each policy covers [the
manufacturer'sl liability. There is nothing in
the policies that provides a reduction of the
insurer's liability if the injury occurs in part
during a policy period.... IThe policies] cover
[the manufacturer'sl entire liability once they
are triggered."8
5
Second, the court noted that the progres-
sion of asbestos-related disease is not linear in
character.86 Citing Insurance Co. of North America v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,87 the tourt rejected a
78. See Gillespie, supra note 33. at 538.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. 626 A.2d at 502.
82. See id. at 508-09.
83. See id. at 507-08.
84. Id. at 507.
85. Id. (quoting Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N,
Am.. 667 F.2d 1034, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
86. Id.
87. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). clarified. 657 F2d
817. cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). The court noted in
Forty-Eight Insulations that "[alsbestosis is a progressive
disease. It ordinarily takes years of breathing asbestos
pro rata allocation based on temporal risk 88
"To apportion liability among the insurers on a
strictly temporal basis in direct proportion to
the length of time each insurer was on the risk
... assumes a linearity of disease progression
which this record does not support."89
Third, the court rejected allocating indem-
nity to i.H. France for periods that it was unin-
sured.90 Again looking to the Keene decision,
the J.H. France court referred to allocating lia-
bility based on periods of self insurance -a
judicial fiction Ithatl cannot be supported."9'
Rather, under the court's definition of injury
the triggering harm was continuous through-
out the uncovered periods. 92 The insured
could, therefore, collect from an insurer who
issued policies that covered time periods pre-
vious to the occurrence of any injuries, even if
the insured chose not to purchase any insur-
ance for those years- An interpretation barring
allocation of liability to an insured for an unin-
sured period also likely applies to pollution
exclusions, self insurance and carrier insolven-
cy 9 3
Fourth, the court reasoned that the defini-
tion of "occurrence" in the CGL policies sug-
gests that any triggered insurance policy is
liable for the entire amount of any judgment or
settlement.9 4 Because an occurrence, as
defined by the policies, typically includes "con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to conditions
which result in bodily injury," the court rea-
soned that the drafters of the policy contem-
plated the possibility of injury resulting from
fibers for asbestosis to occur. The more asbestos fibers
a person inhales the more quickly a worker will contact
asbestosis See 663 F2d at 1214
88 See I H France. 626 A2d at 508
89 Id-
90. Seeid
91 Id The term "self insurance" refers to periods
when the insured chooses to bear the risk of operation
without insurance See Armstrong World Indus- v. Aetna
Cas & Sur Co .45 Cal- App 4th 1, 56-57 11996j Because
no insurance company indemnifies the risk, the insured
who carries the nsk is said to be -self insured -See id
92 See I H France, 626 A2d at 508
93, See Gillespie. supra note 33, at 547.
94- See I H France. 626 A2d at 508-
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continuous or repeated exposure and specified
therefore that the process of exposure could
constitute one occurrence. 9' If prolonged expo-
sure resulted in an injury, and the exposure
occurred during the policy period, the injury
was an insured risk under the policy.9 6
Therefore, according to the court, the insurer
must bear potential liability for the entire
claim.
97
The J.H. France court went further than the
Keene court, however. While the Keene court
would not allow an insured to stack policies,
the J.H. France court suggested that it would.98
While adhering to the Keene court's formulation
of selecting a primary insurer, the J.H. France
court also ruled that when the policy limit of a
selected insurer is exhausted, an insured may
seek indemnification from any of the remain-
ing insurers that were on the risk at the time
the injury occurred.9 Because only primary
policies were at issue in J.H. France,00 the
court's ruling allowing insureds to seek indem-
nity from more than one insurer must be read
as permission to stack.101
B. Pro Rata Allocation
Many courts reject joint and several alloca-
tion and instead allocate costs on a pro-rata




98. Id. at 508-09.
99. Id. at 509. while the issue in J.H. France was only
whether the insured's primary insurers would cover its
losses, the court's analysis suggests that it would also
allow vertical exhaustion of excess policies.
100. Id. at 508; accord General Refractories Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 1994 WL 246375, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 8,
1994) ("ITIhe J.H. France... case dealt with the obligations
of a primary insurer.")
101. See Gillespie, supra note 33, at 548.
102. See OsTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 16. at § 6.02
(describing pro rata apportionment as "the majority
rule"). In determining coverage allocation, courts com-
monly use either policy limits or years. See, e.g., Gulf
Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals &
Minerals Corp., I F.3d 365, 372 (5th cir. 1993) (applying
years of risk); Continental Cas. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 823 F.2d 708. 712 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying pro rata
allocation based on policy limits); Commercial Union Co.
ference between joint and several allocation
with stacking and pro rata allocation is that pro
rata allocation allows the policy hiolder to
recover only a portion of each triggered poli-
cy.103
The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a
pro rata allocation scheme in 1994 in Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co.,104 analyzing in
great detail the other means of allocating lia-
bility. The court also adopted a continuous
trigger for progressive injury and bodily dam-
age cases,' 0' and adopted a scheme that allo-
cated liability across the entire period that the
injury or damage occurs. 106 The opinion, which
analyzed and rejected the Keene scheme of joint
and several allocation, concluded that the lan-
guage of the standard form CGL contract did
not resolve how to allocate liability.107 The
court, therefore, looked to common principles
of insurance contract interpretation, but found
no solutions there either.108 The court finally
concluded that "public interest factors" should
serve as its primary guides in allocating cover-
age. 109 Grounded in the goals of maximizing
coverage and ensuring justice, the court adopt-
ed an indemnification scheme that allocated
losses "on the basis of policy limits, multiplied
by years of coverage."'"10
The Owens-Illinois court, in deciding when
v. National Ins. Co., 765 F2d 1543, 1546 (11 th Cir 1985)
(applying pro rata allocation based years of coverage);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,
633 F.2d 1212, 1223 (6th Cir. 1980), clarified, 657 F2d 616
(6th Cir.), cert. Denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); (applying pro
rata based on years of exposure); CNA Cas v. Seaboard
Sur. Co.. 176 Cal. App. 3d 598, 619-20 (1986) (applying pro
rata based on policy limits); Armstrong World Indus, v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 45 Cal, App, 4th I, 52 (1986) (apply-
ing pro rata based on policy limits),
103. See Neil H. Selman, Exposure to a Manifest
Injustice: The Argument Against Horizontal Stacking in Latent
Injury and Damage Cases, Mealey's Litigation Reports,
Insurance, Nov 27, 1990, at 20, available in WESTLAW,
MLRINS Database.
104. 650 A.2d at 974.
105. See id. at 984.
106. See id. at 995.
107. See id. at 988-90.
108. See id. at 991.
109. See id. at 992.
110. Id. at 993.
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asbestos-related property damage occurred,
ruled that the "injury process" resulting from
asbestos exposure lasted "from installation lof
the asbestos] through discovery or remedia-
tion.""' The Owens-Illinois court, however,
rejected the 'Keene court's reasoning that any
injury results in indemnity. Where the Keene
court found ambiguity in policies' definitions
of "exposure," "manifestation," "bodily injury,"
"sickness" and "disease," the Owens-Illinois court
did notY'2 Rather, the court had difficulty
deciding what level of exposure constituted a
liability-triggering "occurrence." 13 As the court
acknowledged:
Our concepts of legal causation were
developed in an age of Newtonian
physics, not molecular biology. Were it
possible to know when a toxic sub-
stance clicks on a switch that alters
irrevocably the composition of the
body and before which no change has
'occurred,' we might be more confident
that occurrence causing damages had
taken place during a particular poli-
cy.114
Determining the choice of trigger, the court
concluded, required an analysis of the scope of
coverage that triggered policies would cover' 5
The court, therefore, looked to the allocation
methods adopted by other courts.'16
After introducing the basic language of
joint and several and pro rata liability," 7 the
Owens-Illinois court looked to the language of
the policies to see if the solution could be
found there."18 Owens-Illinois directed the court
to the "all sums" language adopted as control-
ling by the Keene court."19 The insurance com-
111. Id. at 984.
112. Id. The California Supreme Court in Montrose
similarly found no ambiguity in the policy language, 913
R2d at 889.
113. See Owens-Illinois, 650 A-2d at 985.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 985-88.
117. See id.
panies argued that the policies' -all sums" lan-
guage should be qualified by the definition of
.occurrence," which the insurers argued
required them to pay only for injuries or prop-
erty damage that occurred "during the policy
period.'120 The court rejected both arguments
as "flawed."
121
The court agreed that the policy language
was not so broad as Owens-Illinois would like,
noting-
IOwens-lllinoisl excess policy states that
it "applies only to personal injury...
which occurs during the policy period
"Property damage is defined in the
OIL policy as "physical injury to or
destruction of tangible property which
occurs during the policy period ....-
The policies do not apply to injuries
that occur outside the policy period
Coverage is provided only for personal
injury or property damage "to which
this insurance applies- and the insur-
ance "applies" only to personal injury
or property damage -which occurs dur-
ing the policy period.1 22
According to the court, the Keene decision did
not clearly set forth how one policy's limit
would apply to each injury, because its defini-
tion of injury was ambiguous, 23 The Keene def-
inition of "injury" could mean either each claim
of injury or each cause of injury,2 4 Concluding
that the Keene court intended "injury" to refer to
each claim of injury, the Owens-Illinois court con-
cluded that this reading created anomalous
results in two circumstances and rejected it_125
The court, however, also noted that the
insurers' reading of the policy language was





123 Seeid at 986
124 See id
125. Id at 986-87 The New Jersey Supreme Court
reasoned that the Keene court's definition of iniury would
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"intuitively suspect."126 According to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, "Itlhe language was
never intended to cover apportionment when
continuous injury occurs over multiple
years." 27 While noting that "some of the dam-
age ... occurred in each of the years of expo-
sure," the court concluded that the language of
the contracts at issue could not definitively
resolve the allocation question. 28 The court
also rejected the Keene court's use of "other
insurance" clauses to allow contribution
among various insurers, concluding that these
provisions only applied when policies tempo-
rally overlapped.
129
The court then concluded that common
tools of insurance contract interpretation did
not resolve the issue. 30 The court did not
believe that it was possible to gauge what
Owens-Illinois could reasonably have expected
for the extended types of claims implicated by
the long-term exposure claims asserted
against it.13 1 Finally, the court rejected the doc-
trine of contra preferentem.-construing ambigui-
ties against the insurers as drafters-because
of the lack of certainty that would result.
32
The court concluded that "public interest
factors" should guide its decision. 33 The court
intended its rule to encourage the purchase of
impair the clean-up of massive environmental problems,
because the insured would only have access to a single
policy or vertical column of coverage. See id. at 987.
However, the Keene court's allowance of the policyholder
selecting which policy would indemnify each loss would
allow the full recovery for a number of small claims that
combined to total more than the uncovered massive envi-
ronmental claims. See id. The Owens-Illinois court also noted
that if all the damage could be claimed in one year, no
other policies but for that year should be triggered. Id.
126." See id. at 989.
127. Id. at 989.
128. Id. at 990. The court noted that insurance
industry sources, as reflected by drafting history and the
statements of those involved in the industry, suggested
that multiple policies could be triggered in the case of
"progressive environmental disease." See id. However, the
court also concluded that the drafters did not decide how
to apportion coverage liability when such a situation
occurred. See id.
129. Seeid. at 990-91.
130. Seeid.at991.
131. See id.
insurance in order to maximize the amount of
resources available to handle claims brought
by injured parties.' 34 Concerned that by allow-
ing policyholders to recover for periods in
which they were self insured, the court ruled
that policyholders would be responsible for
paying for all periods of "self insurance."'" As
a matter of simple justice, the court drew a dis-
tinction between the policyholder that pur-
chased insurance in Years I and 20 and the
policyholder that purchased twenty years of
coverage.
136
The Owens-Illinois court's solution was an
allocation scheme that prorated losses among
carriers "on the basis of policy limits, multi-
plied by years of coverage." 37 The court's opin-
ion, by allocating liability to all triggered poli-
cies, allowed a policyholder to stack its cover-
age. 38 While the court did not explicitly deal
with the issue of exhaustion, it seems likely
that if an insured's primary pclicies were
exhausted, the court would consider its excess
policies triggered and apportion liability
accordingly 39
132. See id. The court noted that In Eagle-Picher
Industries v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 523 F Supp 110, 114
(D. Mass 1981), affd as modified. 682 R2d 12 list CIr 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983), the insured preferred a
manifestation trigger but that in Insuranc.e Co of North
America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F2d 1212. 1222
(6th Cir. 1980), the insured preferred the exposure trigger,
See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 991-92. As the court conclud-
ed, "Itlo have shifting rules of interpretation that depend
on the configuration of insurance coverage is unaccept-
able to us." Id.
133. See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 992.
134. See id.
135. See id,
136. As the Keene court noted, so loig as the poli-
cyholder's liability fell below the policy limit, the Insurer
that purchased insurance in Years I and 20 could recover
the exact same award as the insurer that purchased Insur-
ance for all twenty years, See id.
137. Id. at 989-90.
138. See id. at 994.
139. See id. at 989-90.
olomm 5, Numbof 2Joren S. Bass
Witer 1999 A~~ullni iimek 
k
C. Distinguishing Joint and Several and Pro
Rata Allocation
The following hypothetical reflects the dif-
ferent forms of joint and several allocation and
pro rata allocation. Assume four different com-
panies issued primary insurance policies to a
company whose pollution over a period of
twenty years resulted in a verdict of $15 mil-
lion.
Under a joint and several formula like that
adopted by the Keene court, which did not allow
the policyholder to stack its coverage, the pol-
icyholder would select the largest policy avail-
able to it. In this case, the policy holder would
choose one of the policies issued by Company
D. The policyholder would, therefore, recover
only $4 million dollars towards the verdict. 40
Under the J.H. France joint and several formula,
where the policyholder may stack its coverage.
Table
Insurance Policy period Policy limit Percentage of Company's Years /
Company. total coverage percentage of percentages of
total covera.e covexae.
Company A Year I S.5 million 1.37%
Year2 S.5 million 1.37%
Year 3 S.5 million 1.37%
Year4 S.5 million 1.37% _
Year5 S.5 million 1.37% 6.85% 5/25%
Conpany B Year6 SI million 2.74%
Year7 SI million 2.74%
Year 8 S1 million 2.74%
Year9 S1 million 2.74%
Year 10 SI million 2.74%
Year II S1 million 2.74% 16.44% 6 / 30%
Company C Year 12 $2 million 5.48%
Year 13 S2 million 5.48%
Year 14 S2 million 5.48%
Year 15 S2 million 5.48% 21.92 4/20%
Company D Year 16 $4 million 10.96%
Year 17 S4 million 10.96%
Year 18 S4 million 10.96%
Year 19 $4 million 10.96%
Year 20 $4 million 10.96% 54.08 5/25%
TOTALS S36.5 million
140. This highlights the distinction between using million dollars, the policyholder could -de facto stack:
joint and several allocation in the asbestos or products and assign liability throughout the twenty-year period of
liability forum and in the environmental pollution forum. coverage, thereby covering the entire liability. See Keene
Were the claim not a single $15 million verdict, under Corp v. Ins Co. of N. Am. 667 F2d 1034, 1049 (DC Cir.
which the policyholder in the hypothetical can receive at 1981).
best $4 million, but three thousand verdicts totaling $15
kakso ad lavu awkwo" W*W'm 1999
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the policyholder would be free to select any
policy before the one issued in Year 17 (after
which coverage would be incomplete). The
insurance companies would then fight a sec-
ondary contribution battle to determine how
to allocate costs.'
4'
Under a prorated scheme based on years,
the breakdown would be simple because
Companies A and D each indemnified one
quarter of the time, each would be required to
pay one quarter of the verdict, or $3.75 million;
Company B would be required to pay $4.5 mil-
lion and Company C would pay $3 million.
Risk-based pro rata schemes, however,
tend to be far more complex. Because they
require analysis of the total risk underwritten
by each insurer based on the insured's total
coverage, an extra level of analysis is required
to determine, an insurer's total liability.
Therefore, under the Owens-Illinois formula,
because Company A underwrote 6.85% of the
risk (time and policy levels), its liability would
be $1.1 i2 million; Company B would be liable
for $2.466 million (16.44% of the risk);
Company C for $3.288 million (21.92%); and
Company D for $8.112 million (54.08%).
Moreover, as Gillespie notes, pro rata alloca-
tion allows vertical exhaustion. 142 If liability
forces an insured to exhaust its primary poli-
cies, the insured may turn to its excess insurers
to supplement coverage. 43
Additionally, as the New Jersey Supreme
Court noted, no real difference in principle dis-
tinguishes joint and several allocation from
pro rata allocation. 144 Under both formulas,
allocation will exist among insurers on the risk,
whether through an explicit requirement that
all insurance companies indemnify jointly and
141. In California this battle would be resolved by
prorating the award on the basis of policy limits. See
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co.. 492 P.2d 673,
680 (Cal. 1972).
142. Gillespie, supra note 33, at 539.
143. See id.
144. See Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 989-90.
145. See id. at 989.
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667
E2d 1034, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
severally or through contribution actions
based in the "other insurance" clauses con-
tained in the standard CGL policies. 14' Rather,
the court recognized that the key difference
was the way the different allocation schemes
treat periods of self insurance. 146 Under the
joint and several formula, periods of self insur-
ance did not effect coverage because the poli-
cies cover the entire liability once they are cov-
ered. 47 Under a scheme requiring proration,
however, insurance companies are not
required to pay costs related to "occurrences"
that took place outside of the policy period.
48
Under the Owens-Illinois scheme, if the
hypothetical company above chose to bear the
risk of Years 19 and 20, it would be held
responsible for 21.92% of the award ($3.288
million). Note, however, that this assumes that
the company would have borne the same risk,
as it did in the previous year. As the Owens-
Illinois court pointed out, determining what risk
a self-insured company assumed must gener-
ally be done by a special master 149 Under a
joint and several scheme that allowed the
insured to stack its coverage, or under a verdict
basing liability on numerous separate injuries
where the policyholder could de facto stack,150
the company could assign all of its liability to
Years other than 19 and 20, thereby avoiding
any liability for the "self insurance' years. 15 1
IV. California Insurance Law And Montrose
Chemical Corp. of California 'v. Admiral
Insurance Co.
In 1995, the California Supreme Court
adopted a continuous injury trigger for claims
of continuous or progressively deteriorating
148. Accord Owens-Illinois, 650 A 2d at 993, See, eg,,
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Inulatlons, Inc,
633 F.2d 1212, 1222 (6th Cir 1980).
149. See 650 A.2d at 989-90.
150. See id. at 992,
151. Note the uncertainty that can rasult from this
sort of proration. The New Jersey Supreme Court seemed
to recognize the possible complications, especially when
allocating between primary and excess Insurers, and
where the policyholder has self Insured some period of
risk. See id. at 994.
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damage or injury brought under third party
CGL policies in Montrose Chemical Corp. of
California v. Admiral Insurance Co."52 The court
relied on some of the language and drafting
history of CGL policies, case law and other
authorities, and practical and policy considera-
tions to reach its decision. 153 While the
Montrose court did not decide the allocation
issue, the Owens-Illinois court did by adopting a
continuous trigger;154 the principles of law and
policy the court relied on are the same factors
a California court deciding the allocation issue
would use.
A. Facts and Procedural History of Montrose
Chemical Corp. of California v. Admiral
Insurance Co.
Between 1947 and 1982, Montrose
Chemical Corp. manufactured the pesticide
dichlorodiphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) at its
plant in Torrance, California. 15" During that
time, Montrose shipped chemical wastes that
resulted from the manufacturing process to the
Stringfellow waste disposal site in Riverside,
California. 156 It also shipped'chemicals to the
Parr-Richmond Terminal site in Contra Costa
County, California, for commercial processing
by an independent company.157 In separate
actions, Montrose was sued by the state and
federal governments for reimbursement for the
152. 913 P.2d878 (1995).
153. See id. at 885-94.
154. See discussion supra Part II.B.
155. See Montrose. 913 P.2d at 881.
156. See id. at 882.
157. See id. at 883.
158. See United States v. J.B. Stringfellow, No. C-83-
3501 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The government sued under CER-
CLA and also seeks damages for injury to natural
resources, abatement of conditions, and cleanup at and
near the Stringfellow site. See Montrose, 913 P.2d at 881.
159. See Newman v. J.B. Stringfellow. No. 165994MF
(Super Ct. Riverside Co.) (unpublished opinion). Plaintiffs
allege that bodily injury and property damage occurred on
a continuing basis, commencing in 1956 and extending to
the present. See Montrose. 913 P.2d at 882. Their claim
includes allegations that 27 wrongful deaths occurred as
a result of the Stringfellow contamination.
160. See Parr-Richmond Terminal Co. v. Levin
investigation, removal and remediation of
toxic waste contamination at the Stringfellow
site,.1 8 and by private parties for bodily injury
and property damage alleged to have resulted
from the release of contaminants from the
Stringfellow site.1 9 Montrose's alleged CER-
CLA liability at the Levin Metals site resulted
from its shipment of chemicals used by an
independent company that is alleged to have
contaminated the soil, groundwater and sur-
face water at the Parr-Richmond Terminal site
in Contra Costa County. California, 160
In 1986. Montrose sued its insurance com-
panies seeking a declaratory judgment that the
insurer had a duty to both defend and indem-
nify Montrose in the five underlying actions.161
All insurers except Admiral agreed to defend,
subject to a reservation of rights.162 in 1989,
Admiral moved for summary judgment and
summary adjudication, urging the trial court to
find that Admiral had no duty to defend or
indemnify Montrose in the Levin Metals cases
because the circumstances that trigger cover-
age did not occur during Admiral's policy peri-
ods. 163 Also. Admiral argued that it had no duty
to defend or indemnify Montrose in the
Stringfellow case because the contamination
in that case was an uninsurable loss in
progress that began prior to the effective date
of the first policy issued by Admiral 164
Metals Corp. No C-85-4776 SC IN D, Cal 1985J; Levin
Metals Corp v Parr-Richmond Terminal Co, Nos C-84-
6273 SC & 84-6324 SC (N D Cal 19841, Levin Metals Corp
v Parr-Richmond Terminal Co, No 255836 (Super Ct.
Contra Costa County) !unpubished opiniony
161 The court noted that the only issue it was
resolving was the insurers7 duty to defend Montrose. See
Montrose, 913 P2d at 884 n_9 Because no liability had
been established, the court held, the court could only rule
on whether the insurance companies had a duty to defend
the claims Set id The court also pointed out that an insur-
ance company s duty to defend a claim did not necessari-
ly result in a duty to indemnify claims See d 'Moreover. in
a declaratory relief action held before the insured's liabil-
ity to third party claimants has been established, the trial
court will be unable to determine the amount of the
insurer's indemnity obligation-' ld icitations omitted).
162. Seeid at 884
163 See id
164. seid,
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The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Admiral on both issues.165 The court
first held that coverage for third party claims of
progressive property damage under a CGL pol-
icy is triggered upon manifestation of the dam-
age.16 Therefore, there was no possibility of
coverage under Admiral's policies because the
third-party claimant had allegedly discovered
the contamination at the Parr-Richmond site
before the start of Admiral's first policy.167 The
court then ruled that Montrose was barred
from recovering for all claims related to the
Stringfellow site because Montrose knew prior
to the commencement of the Admiral policies
that liability for property damage or bodily
injury resulting from contamination at the site
was "likely."168 Montrose appealed. 69
The California Court of Appeal reversed the
summary judgment order, rejecting the lower
court's "manifestation" or "discovery" trigger
analysis, finding it incompatible with the lan-
guage of the Admiral policies. 7 0 Rather, the
court held that the underlying Levin Metals
cases contained allegations of continuous or
progressively deteriorating property damage
that had "occurred" throughout the period
Admiral's policies were in effect.'71 Therefore,
according to the appellate court, potential cov-
erage under those policies was triggered. 172
The court also ruled that the lower court's "loss
in progress" rule did not bar coverage for the
Stringfellow cases.'73 The court reasoned that
Montrose's potential liability to third parties
for the progressive property damage had
"occurred" throughout the period of Admiral's
165. See id.
166. See id. Under the manifestation trigger, cover-
age is available only when the bodily harm or property
damage manifests itself. See Robinson, supra note 5, at
516-17. The date of the resulting harm is the point in time
when the bodily injury or property damage is discovered.
See id. California. moreover, applies a manifestation trig-
ger for first party property insurance cases. See Prudential-
LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court. 51 Cal. 3d 674,
686-87 (1990) (triggering first party policies at "that point
In time when appreciable damage occurs and is or should
be known to the insured, such that a reasonable insured
would be aware that his notification duty under the poli-
cy has been triggered").
167. See id.
policies and was therefore insurable under the
California Insurance Code. 174 The appeals court
then remanded the case, declining to address
Admiral's affirmative defense and other insurer
arguments. 17 5 The California Supreme Court
granted Admiral's petition for review "to con-
sider the complex and important issue of when
potential coverage is triggered under a third
party CGL policy where the underlying third
party claims involve continuous or progres-
sively deteriorating damage that occurred dur-
ing Admiral's policy periods."' 76
B. The California Supreme Court's Decision
The California Supreme Court adopted a
continuous injury trigger, whereby bodily
injuries and property damage that are continu-
ous or progressively deteriorating throughout
successive policy periods are covered by all
policies in effect during those periods. 77 The
court's analysis of contract language, case law,
and public policy are all important to analyze
which allocation scheme applies, Therefore,
this Note will discuss the court's analysis of
each prong separately.
1. Policy Language and Standard Rules of
Contract Interpretation
The court first set forth a number of max-
ims of California insurance law. The court first
noted that if there is ambiguity in the policies,
section 1649 of the California Insurance Code
requires that "it is resolved by interpreting the
ambiguous provisions in the sense the
promisor (i.e., the insurer) bElieved the
168. See Montrose. 913 P.2d at 884. The trial court
based its ruling regarding the Stringfellow site on sec-
tions 22 and 250 of the California Insurance Code, which








176. Id. at 884-86.
177. See Id. at 902.
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promisee understood them at the time of for-
mation."178 If application of section 1649 does
not resolve the ambiguity, the policies should
be construed against the party that caused the
ambiguous language to exist.179 The court fur-
ther noted that it generally resolves ambiguity
in favor of coverage and generally interprets
coverage clauses broadly in order to protect
the reasonable expectations of the insureds.'8 0
The court concluded, however, that because
"the express language of Admiral's policies of
insurance; when read as a whole, unambigu-
ously provides potential coverage for the con-
tinuous and progressively deteriorating bodily
injury and property damage alleged to have
occurred during Admiral's policy period," it did
not need to resort to judicial default rules.' 8 '
After reciting Admiral's definition of "all
sums,"' 82  "property damage." 183  "bodily
injury"184 and "occurrence," 85 the court con-
cluded that the policies clearly and explicitly
provided that the occurrence of bodily injury or
property damage during the policy period is
the operative event that triggers coverage. 86
Therefore, according to the court, because
Montrose was alleged to have caused continu-
ous or progressively deteriorating damage to
178. Cal. Insur Code § 1649 (Deering 1997).
179. See Cal. Insur. Code § 1654 (Deering 1997).
180. See Montrose. 913 P.2d at 889. "These rules stem
from the fact that the insurer typically drafts policy lan-
guage. leaving the insured little or no meaningful oppor-
tunity or ability to bargain for modifications." Id.
181. Id.
182. Admiral promised "'to pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of ... bodily injury, or
... property damage to which this insurance applies .... " Id,
183. The policies defined 'property damage" as
"'physical injury to or destruction of tangible property
which occurs during the policy period, including the loss of use
thereof at any time resulting therefrom .... - Id.
184. The policies defined "bodily injury" as "bodily
injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person which
occurs during the policy period, including death at any time
resulting therefrom.'" Id.
185. The policies defined "occurrence" as "an acci-
dent, including continuous or repeated exposure to con-
ditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
the third party litigants and their property, the
Admiral policies were triggered by their plain
language
8 7
2. Case Law and the Drafting of the
Standard Form CGL Policies
The court began its case law analysis by
noting that California courts have long held
that coverage is established at the time of
injury.188 The California Supreme Court also
noted approvingly the Court of Appeal's con-
clusion that the drafting history of the standard
form COL policy compelled the conclusion that
the policy language provided for liability when-
ever damage or injury occurs within a policy
period. 8 9 It recognized both the industry's
intent that the -occurrence policy" be able to
respond to situations involving a related
series of events attributable to the same fac-
tor." 90 and its awareness that "in some expo-
sure type cases involving cumulative injuries it
is possible that more than one policy will
afford coverage,' 9' The court reasoned that the
insurers did not intend the triggering device for
the policies solely to be an accident in the lit-
eral sense-no sudden precipitating event-
but rather that it could also be an injury that
insured'" Id at 890
186 Seeid
187, See id-
188 Set id (quoting Remmer v Glens Falls Indem
Co.. 295 P2d 19, 21 (Cal Ct App 1956) i"rhe general rule
is that the time of the occurrence of an accident within the
meaning of an indemnity policy is not the time the wrong-
ful act was committed, but the time when the complain-
ing party was actually damaged "i
189 See Montrose, 913 P2d at 891 The court explic-
itly rejected Admirals contention that the drafting history
would not be considered See d Rather, the court con-
duded that it was -reasonable to infer that the insurance
industry knew precisely what" the change from accident-
based policies to occurrence policies entailed. See id.
190, Id at 892 (quoting Richard H. Elliot, secretary
to the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters. com-
menting on the 1966 revisions of the CGL standard form
policy, in Richard H Elliot. The New Comprehensive General
Liability Policy, in LmBisw INsuwmciE DispumS 1968, at 12-15
(PLI. Schreiber edit 1968))
191 Id- at 891 (quoting Elliot. supra note 188, at 12-
3 to 12-5)
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takes place over an extended time before it
becomes evident. 92 The court's conclusion
regarding the insurer's understanding of the
triggering event serves as a strong recommen-
dation of which allocation scheme to adopt:
[Tlhe drafters of the standard occur-
rence-based CGL policy . . . contem-
plated that the policy would afford lia-
bility coverage for all property damage
or injury occurring during the policy
period resulting from an accident, or
from injurious exposure to conditions.
Nothing in the policy language pur-
ports to exclude damage or injury of a
continuous or progressively deteriorat-
ing nature, as long as it occurs during a
policy period. Nor is there any basis for
inferring that an insured's understanding
and reasonable expectations regard
scope of coverage for damage or injury
occasioned during the effective policy
period of an occurrence-based CGL
policy would have been otherwise.
93
The Montrose court effectively ruled that the
two strongest guides courts use in determining
which allocation scheme to adopt, the plain
language of the policies and the parties' rea-
sonable expectations, point directly to a joint
and several scheme.
The Montrose court also looked to case law
to determine how other state and federal
192. See id. at 892.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 896-901.
195. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462 (1983).
196. See Montrose, 913 P.2d at 898-99. "IWlhere suc-
cessive CGL policies have been purchased, bodily injury
and property damage that is continuing or progressively
deteriorating throughout more than one policy period is
potentially covered by all policies in effect during those
periods." Id. at 902. It should be noted that the Montrose
court did not comment on the allocation issue raised in
either Keene or Forty-Eight Insulations. See id. at 898-99. While
the California Supreme Court's approval of these deci-
sions, both of which also advocate joint and several allo-
cation, see discussion supra Part III.A, persuasively sup-
ports the argument that the court would approve of a
Joint and several allocation, the Montrose decision did not
resolve the allocation Issue. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 898-99.
courts had interpreted third party COL poli-
cies. 194 The court first noted that it had
adhered to the decisions reacl'ed by the
California Court of Appeal in California Union
Insurance Co. v. Landmark Insurance Co., 19 which
followed closely the trigger of harm holdings of
the United States Circuit Courts for the District
of Columbia in Keene and the Sixth Circuit in
Forty-Eight Insulations.'96 The court grounded its
decision, in part, in the fact that the highest
courts for the states of New Jersey,
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania also adopted
the continuous injury trigger' 9 Wl-ere succes-
sive CGL policies have been triggered, the
court followed the trend set by federal and
state courts and adopted the contiruous injury
trigger for third party claims of continuous or
progressively deteriorating damage or injury.
3. California Public Policy
The Montrose court also looked to public
policy considerations in reaching its decision.
In rejecting Admiral's argument that a continu-
ous injury trigger would lessen the predictabil-
ity of insurance litigation, the court recognized
that equity often plays an important role in
reaching its judicial decisions. 98 Moreover, the
court noted that the insurance industry itself
had set forth a number of strong policy consid-
erations favoring the continuous injury trig-
ger.199 Therefore, the court reasoned, the insur-
ance industry could expect protection under
the court's equitable power, Moreover, since
197. See id. at 901 n,22 (citing Trustee. , of Tufts Unlv,
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 616 N.E,2d 68, 74 (Mass,
1993); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626
A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993); Owens-Illinois, Inc v. United Ins.
Co. 650 A.2d 974, 990 (N.J. 1994)).
198. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 902-03 (citing American
Home Prod. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 565 F Supp 1485,
1501-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd as modified 748 F2d 760 (2d
Cir. 1984), and noting that that carriers considered It arbi-
trary for all damages to be telescoped into a single policy
period).
199. Montrose, 913 P,2d at 903 (citing Note,
Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1458, 1581 (1986) (suggesting that "because it
encourages all insurers to monitor risks and change
appropriate premiums, the continuous trigger rule
appears to be the most efficient doctrine for toxic waste
cases")).
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the insurance industry had itself advanced pol-
icy reasons supporting the adoption of a con-
tinuous trigger, it could not be heard to com-
plain about policy considerations against a
continuous trigger.
V. The Solution To California's Allocation
Problem
As the Keene, Forty-Eight Insulations and
Owens-Illinois decisions reflect, no standard res-
olution of the allocation issue exists.2°° Rather,
courts have used the same contract language
principles of policy interpretation and public
policies to reach broadly differing results. In
Montrose, however, the California Supreme
Court set forth an initial approach to interpret-
ing CGL policies and commented extensively
on many of the leading allocation cases from
different jurisdictions. There is therefore more
guidance here than usually exists in an area of
law as unsettled as the allocation of liability
under CGL policies for third party claims of
continuous progressively deteriorating bodily
injury or property damage. 20 1 Based on the
Montrose decision and the public policy issues
raised therein, as well as on the decisions of
the courts of other jurisdictions and other
issues of public policy, California should adopt
an allocation scheme that blends joint and
several allocation with proration.
When attempting to determine which trig-
ger of coverage to adopt for third party CGL
policies, the California Supreme Court looked
to the language of the insurance policies and
rules of interpretation, to other courts' inter-
200. Of course, the best way to avoid allocation
issues in the future would be to incorporate into CGL
policies a clause setting forth how third party liability for
continuous or progressively deteriorating bodily lnlury or
property damage claims will be resolved.
201. Indeed, language in Montrose could be argued
to advocate adoption of an equity-based pro rata scheme
with stacking and contribution. 913 P.2d at 902 ('leaving
aside the availability of excess (multiple) policies or
.other insurance' clauses, and absent express policy lan-
guage decreeing the manner of apportionment of contri-
bution among successive liability insurers, the courts will
generally apply equitable considerations to spread the
cost among the several policies and insurers"). Adoption
of a pro rated scheme grounded In "equity," as the
pretations of the policy language, and to pub-
lic policy. 2D2 In order to reach a conclusion
about how to allocate liability for these same
policies, analysis of the same factors is neces-
sary.
A. Which Allocation Scheme Do the Policy
Language, Contract Interpretation Rules
and Public Policy Dictate?
Proponents of both joint and several and
proration allocation schemes argue that the
policy language supports their decisions. Joint
and several proponents argue that the "all
sums" language supports their position; prora-
tion proponents argue that the joint and sever-
al proponents ignore the limiting phrase -for
bodily injury or property damage which occurs
during the policy period. "23 Thus, as numerous
courts have recognized, the policy language
does not offer any conclusive solutions. There
is. however, language that does suggest how
funds should be received.204
Many excess policies contain "other insur-
ance" clauses, which typically assign liability to
primary carriers when there is "other valid and
collectible insurance."205 Therefore, the terms
of the other insurance clauses seem to pre-
clude either vertical exhaustion, which looks to
excess policies before exhausting all primary
policies (even though other primary policies
have been triggered), or proration that does
not exhaust all primary policies before looking
to the excess policies.
Montrose dicta suggests, would leave insureds and insurers
few standards by which to guide their decisions or argu-
ments and would do nothing to lower transaction costs or
encourage settlement- The Monlrose dicta, to the extent
that it suggests an equity-based allocation scheme,
should not be adopted
202 See discussion supra Part IVB
203 See Gillespie, supra note 33, at 561-63,
204, See Silverman & Essig, supra note 39, at 75
205 See Gillespie, supra note 33, at 563 (citing
General Refractories Co v Allstate Ins Co, 1994 WL
246375. at "4 (E D Pa 1994) lproviding that liability will
not arise in excess policies if other insurance is avail-
able))
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B. Principles of Interpretation of Insurance
Contracts
An important question to resolve is what a
reasonable policyholder or insurance company
would expect from a CGL policy where liability
extends through numerous policy periods and
over more than one insurance company.206 As
one authority notes, there is an "appealing intu-
ition" to the notion that the policyholder "should
receive coverage (meaning the full limits of all
policies paid for during the triggered years) in
return for each premium payment."20 Moreover,
as the Montrose court noted, some evidence
exists in the history of policy drafting that the
insurance industry expected more than one pol-
icy to cover a single "occurrence."20 8 It remains
difficult to imagine, however, that the policy-
holder could expect full indemnification for peri-
ods when it chose to self-insure. Also, it seems
unreasonable for an insured to expect coverage
for every year that a disease manifested itself;
rather, the insured seems more likely to have
expected its coverage to manifest itself based on
a more sudden situation like a car accident.2 09
While both sides can make plausible argu-
ments why their "reasonable expectations"
should control the allocation issue, Gillespie
notes that the Owens-Illinois court probably got it
right. According to Gillespie, the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the reasonable expecta-
tions argument on the grounds that it would be
difficult to assess what kind of expectations a
policyholder could reasonably expect with
respect to long-tail environmental or products
liability cases.210 Conversely, because in cases
where California courts cannot determine the
insured's objectively reasonable expectations,
courts construe policy provisions in favor of the
insured; these expectations must remain part of
the analysis even when they are not deter-
minable.2
11
206. See Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d
545, 545 (Cal. 1992).
207. Thomas Baker & Eva Orlebeke, The Application of
Per-Occurrence Limits From Successive Policies, 3 ENVTL. CLAIMS 1.
411, 423 (1991) (quoted in Gillespie, supra note 33, at 566).
208. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 902-03 (quoting Elliot,
supra note 188, at 12-3 to 12-5) (CIlln some exposure type
cases involving cumulative injuries it is possible that
more than one policy will afford coverage.")).
C. Public Policy
The California Supreme Court looked explic-
itly at both the fairness of its trigger decision
and the parties' reasonable expectations.
2 12
While its decision in Montrose did rot hinge on
either factor, it is reasonable to expect that any
solution to the allocation debate be formulated
with both considerations of equity and of the
parties' reasonable expectations in mind.
D. Conclusions
The Montrose decision and California princi-
ples of insurance contract interpretation most
strongly support adopting an apportionment
scheme similar to that chosen by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Owens-Illinois. The standard
CGL policy requires the insurers to indemnify
the policyholder if and only if bodily injury
occurs during the policy period. 213 Therefore,
because the Montrose court ruled that every poli-
cy triggered by continuous or progressively
deteriorating bodily injury or property damage
must respond and pay all sums which the
insured shall be obligated to pay,214 every insur-
er on the risk when any policy was triggered
should respond in full. As the Montrose court
concluded, "an insurer on the risk when contin-
uous or progressively deteriorating damage or
injury first manifests itself remains obligated to
indemnify the insured for the ent rety of the
ensuing damage or injury."215
The court's requirement that all insurers on
the risk at the time of the damage or injury
should pay, however, should not be taken as an
endorsement of joint and several allocation.
Indeed, dicta in the Montrose decision could be
read as an explicit rejection of joint and several
allocation. As the Montrose court noted, It did not
support the lower court's holding
209. See Selman, supra note 103, at 22.
210. Gillespie, supra note 33, at 567.
211. See Bank of the West, 833 R2d at 5L.5
212. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
213. See discussion supra Part II.B.
214. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 901.
215. Id.
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that both insurers in [thel case were
jointly and severally liable for the full
amount of damage occurring during the
successive policy period. (citations omit-
ted) Allocation of the cost of indemnifi-
cation once several insurers have been
found liable.., requires application of
principles of contract law to the express
terms and limitations of the various poli-
cies of insurance on the risk.
216
Under Montrose, therefore, some form of prora-
tion seems mandated.
The only way to guarantee that all insurers
respond "in full" is to hold them all liable for the
risk. Joint and several liability does not ade-
quately do this. Because joint and several liabil-
ity allows the insured to select the policy or poli-
cies that an award will extinguish, it could also
choose not to allocate liability to certain insur-
ers. Under that situation, some-but not all-
insurers would respond in full.2t7
Proration, however, guarantees that all insur-
ance companies on a risk respond to the risk.
Where a loss is continuous and indivisible over
the period of more than one insurance policy, the
prorating of the risk across all triggered policies
spreads the risk among the various insurance
companies who contracted to indemnify that
risk. However, the approach does not require an
insurance company to indemnify periods of self
insurance when the insurance company would
have had a reasonable expectation that it would
be called upon. By balancing the time on the risk
against the risk assumed (measured by the poli-
cy limits issued), the insurance companies' rea-
216. Id. at 898 n.19 (citing Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of
N.Am.. 667 F.2d 1034,1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Insurance Co.
of N. Am. v. Forty Eight Insulators, Inc.. 663 E2d 1212,
1225 (6th Cir. 1980)).
217. Such a result is inconsistent with the principle
set forth in California Civil Code section 1636 that the
mutual intention of the parties should govern the poli-
cies' interpretation. It is unreasonable to suggest that
either insureds or insurance companies could expect cov-
erage for periods of time when the Insured did not pur-
chase a policy and the insurer did not issue one.
218. Owens-Illinois. 650 A.2d at 989-90; see also dis-
cussion supra Part III.B.
219. See discussion supra Part III.C.
220. See Owens-Illinois. 650 A2d at 992.
sonable expectations are fulfilled.
The Owens-Illinois court looked to a combina-
tion of the respective policy limits multiplied by
years of coverage for its apportionment
scheme3 8 As set forth in the previous hypothet-
ical,219 a scheme that looks to the policy limits
multiplied by the years of coverage balances the
companies' guarantee to pay "all sums- against
the relative risk assumed by the insurance com-
panies (reflected by the size of the policy limits).
Rather than providing the policyholder with a
windfall for periods of self insurance, or, as the
New Jersey Supreme Court feared, encouraging
companies to purchase less insurance than nec-
essary to protect against the real level of risk,2 0
the time/risk scheme looks to the reasonable
expectation of the parties.
Because many policies contain an 'other
insurance" clause that requires the exhaustion of
all primary insurance before the excess policies
have been triggered, however, the Owens-Illinois
scheme is inadequate to fully satisfy California's
requirement that the clear language of insurance
contracts govern. 22' While the New Jersey
Supreme Court chose not to resolve how to allo-
cate policies between primary and excess insur-
ers. a solution is simple. Require proration first
among primary insurers (including any periods
of self insurance) and then, only if the primary
layer of coverage is exhausted, turn to the excess
policies. The plain language of the -other insur-
ance" clauses would be honored, the insurance
companies would pay "all sums" necessary to ful-
fill the award, and the insured would not receive
any undeserved windfall 2
221 See Bankof the West v. Superior Court, 833 P2d
545. 545 (Cal 1992j_
222- In such a circumstance, of an insured carried
primary policies for the relevant time period that provid-
ed $25 million of coverage, and then three levels of excess
coverage at $10 million per level, the insured would have
a total of $60 million in coverage- It the insured was liable
for less than $25 million, only the primary policies would
be triggered, with coverage pro rated over the entire time
on the risk If however, liability was $40 million, the lia-
bility would exhaust the entire primary policy, and the
first excess layer of coverage, The remaining liability, $5
million, would be pro rated over the second excess layer.
If the insured chose to self-insure during any period dur-
ing which injury occurred, the insured would be liable for
that portion of the award or settlement
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